2019-12-052019-12-052013-06SILVA, Guilherme Ghisoni da. Recognition and identity: memory as part of the logical structure of the world. O Que nos Faz Pensar, Rio de Janeiro, n. 33, p. 251-270, jun. 2013.e- 0104-6675http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/handle/ri/18410The aim of this paper is to explore three roles ascribed by Wittgenstein to memory in the middle period. Ontologically speaking, memory is regarded as the source of time and as part of the logical structure of the phenomenal world; epistemologically speaking, as the source of our knowledge, that is, as the truth-maker of our phenomenological propositions about the past; and semantically speaking, as the source of identity. I try to show how these three perspectives are interwoven, tracing the epistemological and semantic roles of memory back to its ontological role. I also contrast the phenomenological concept of memory with the physical one (on which memory is a bipolar representation of a past physical event). To understand this contrast, it is crucial to notice that phenomenological time and physical time grant different ontological statuses to present, past, and future. It is the continued existence of the past event in the physicalistic mode of representation of time that makes room for the distinction between the memory of a physical event and its truth-maker. I conclude this paper by showing briefly the importance of the topics discussed for gaining a proper understanding of some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas.engAcesso AbertoPeríodo intermediárioTempoFenomenologiaArgumento da linguagem privadaMiddle periodTimePhenomenologyPrivate language argumentArtigo