Recognition and identity: memory as part of the logical structure of the world
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2013-06
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Resumo
The aim of this paper is to explore three roles ascribed by Wittgenstein to memory
in the middle period. Ontologically speaking, memory is regarded as the source of
time and as part of the logical structure of the phenomenal world; epistemologically
speaking, as the source of our knowledge, that is, as the truth-maker of our
phenomenological propositions about the past; and semantically speaking, as the source of identity. I try to show how these three perspectives are interwoven, tracing
the epistemological and semantic roles of memory back to its ontological role. I also
contrast the phenomenological concept of memory with the physical one (on which
memory is a bipolar representation of a past physical event). To understand this
contrast, it is crucial to notice that phenomenological time and physical time grant
different ontological statuses to present, past, and future. It is the continued existence
of the past event in the physicalistic mode of representation of time that makes room
for the distinction between the memory of a physical event and its truth-maker. I conclude
this paper by showing briefly the importance of the topics discussed for gaining
a proper understanding of some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas.
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Período intermediário, Tempo, Fenomenologia, Argumento da linguagem privada, Middle period, Time, Phenomenology, Private language argument
Citação
SILVA, Guilherme Ghisoni da. Recognition and identity: memory as part of the logical structure of the world. O Que nos Faz Pensar, Rio de Janeiro, n. 33, p. 251-270, jun. 2013.