A noção fregiana de objeto abstrato e a crítica ao psicologismo
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Data
2009-10-02
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Universidade Federal de Goiás
Resumo
The objective of this dissertation is to present Gottlob Frege s criticism of
psychologism in Mathematics and Logic. Our working hypothesis is that Frege s
criticism is based on his notion of an "abstract object". In order to investigate this
hypothesis we will contrast the pre and post paradox phases of Fregean s
philosophy. We will try to show that there is a continuity between these two periods,
and that this continuity depends on Frege s insistence in maintaining the notion of an
"abstract object", even if in a somewhat weakened version. Our dissertation will be
divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, we will make a brief characterization
of psychologism in order to circumscribe the exact focus of Frege s criticism. In the
second chapter we will discuss the notion of an "abstract object" in the pre-paradox
period of Frege s philosophy and its connection to Frege s main concern: that of
defining number upon a pure logical basis. Eventually, in the third chapter, we will
show how, even without a logically unassailable method of introducing logical
objects, due to Russell s paradox, the philosopher does not give up his main theses
concerning the nature of logic and mathematics. They are still grounded on the
notion of an "abstract object", even thought in a somewhat feebler form.
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MAIONE, Vinícius Rodrigues. The fregian notion of abstract object and the criticism to psychologism. 2009. 120 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciências Humanas) - Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiânia, 2009.