2019-09-092019-09-092013-06PORTO, André. Rule-following and functions. O que nos faz pensar, Rio de Janeiro, v. 22, n. 33, p. 95-141, jun. 2013.0104-6675http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/handle/ri/18097This paper presents a new reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s famous (and controversial) rule-following arguments. Two are the novel features offered by our reconstruction. In the first place, we propose a shift of the central focus of the discussion, from the general semantics and the philosophy of mind to the philosophy of mathematics and the rejection of the notion of a function. The second new feature is positive: we argue that Wittgenstein offers us a new alternative notion of a rule (to replace the rejected functions), a notion reminiscent of Category Theory’s notion of a morphism.engAcesso AbertoSeguir regrasRegrasFunções extensionaisOperações intensionaisRule-followingRulesExtensional functionsIntensional operationsArtigo