Quine e Davidson: estimulação distal ou proximal?
Carregando...
Data
2005-12
Autores
Título da Revista
ISSN da Revista
Título de Volume
Editor
Adriano Naves de Brito
Resumo
In this paper I intend to investigate a central point concerning a
famous disagreement between Quine and Davidson, the dispute known in the philosophical literature as “the proximal x distal matter”. Shortly, while
Quine adopts a proximal view, one according to which we should find the
empirical content of the observational sentences in the speaker’s neural
endings, Davidson would rather takes a distal location for this content,
thus presupposing the existence of objects in the world. This discussion is
most relevant to the debate around the “third dogma of empiricism”, proposed
by Davidson and refused by Quine, as well as to the understanding
of Quine’s semantical view as a whole.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Quine, Davidson, Sentenças de observação, Observation sentences
Citação
VELLOSO, Araceli. Quine e Davidson: estimulação distal ou proximal? Philósophos, Goiânia, v. 10, n. 2, p. 57-86, ago./dez. 2005. Disponível em: <https://www.revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/3257/3233>.