Quine e Davidson: estimulação distal ou proximal?

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Data

2005-12

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Editor

Adriano Naves de Brito

Resumo

In this paper I intend to investigate a central point concerning a famous disagreement between Quine and Davidson, the dispute known in the philosophical literature as “the proximal x distal matter”. Shortly, while Quine adopts a proximal view, one according to which we should find the empirical content of the observational sentences in the speaker’s neural endings, Davidson would rather takes a distal location for this content, thus presupposing the existence of objects in the world. This discussion is most relevant to the debate around the “third dogma of empiricism”, proposed by Davidson and refused by Quine, as well as to the understanding of Quine’s semantical view as a whole.

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Palavras-chave

Quine, Davidson, Sentenças de observação, Observation sentences

Citação

VELLOSO, Araceli. Quine e Davidson: estimulação distal ou proximal? Philósophos, Goiânia, v. 10, n. 2, p. 57-86, ago./dez. 2005. Disponível em: <https://www.revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/3257/3233>.