Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia

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A questão da história em Martin Heidegger
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2018-08-17) Amaral, Antônio Henrique Paz do; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Christino, Daniel; Kirchner, Renato
Martin Heidegger did not make a philosophy of history on the side of a philosophy of language, man or being. Nevertheless, the thematic of history was very relevant to his thought, which has always aspired to a unifying totality around the question of the meaning of being. What is the condition of possibility of history? What makes us historical beings? This question is the one that Heidegger calls in Being and Time, the question of the historicity of history. The starting point to think this question is found on the distinctive openness of Dasein to its proper temporality, articulated in three fundamental Ekstasis which unify themselves in the existential of care – in sequence of originality: advenient-future, essential-past and the instant-present. Assuming resolute in its Being-towards-death, the Dasein gives openness to the retrieval of past, as a repetition of utmost and most original possibilities buried by tradition. Another starting point is the questioning of history from the question of the meaning of nihilism and the death of God, which involve our epoch, through a attentive dialogue with Nietzsche’s work. So Heidegger understands our historicity since a essential remission to what that, in its late thinking phase, he calls “history of Being”.
O Fenômeno do mundo em ser e tempo de Heidegger
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2019-11-27) Ferreira, André Prock; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Christino, Daniel; Padua, Ligia Teresa Saramago
This work aims to present a world phenomenon analysis – concept by Heidegger in the existential analytics developed in Being and Time (1927). The world is comprehended by Heidegger as one of the fundamental constitutive of Dasein. Moreover, we intend to show that this investigation performs a decisive function in the argumentative strategy of Heidegger. We will see that the world phenomenon shields a methodologic primacy from the delimitation of the median daily life, once it shows itself as a first horizon to where the Dasein turns in its existence. This way, since the beginning of Heidegger’s investigation, the phenomenon appeared as a question. For this, we will analyze: the phenomenological, in general traces, since its origins in Kant’s thinking and its development from Husserl thinking; some “ways” by which the notion of world is investigated by Husserl; and the indicatives presented by Heidegger in the beginning of the analytics. The guiding principle emerges from those analysis, that is, the pragmatic aspect assumed by the analytics, considering that the most immediate manner through which the Dasein relates itself with (and in) the world is not from a cognitive behavior, but from the usage of utensils. Consequently, we will consider the analysis of the world phenomenon developed by Heidegger in the treaty, presenting the elements regarded for us as fundamental for its elaboration. This way it is inserted in the investigation the theme of spatiality and the language as fundamental elements for its comprehension. From the analysis of these elements, the world phenomenon will reveal a referential complex structured in a “significative totality” (Bedeutungsganze). What lies in the scope of this elaboration of world phenomenon can be understood as a horizon of habitation that shields a poetic dimension. Finally, we present a comparative analysis between the elaboration we intend to develop and two other interpretations. This way, therefore, considering the coverage and the complexity of the world thematic, in a special manner, in the thinking of Heidegger, we do not intend to exhaust it, but to search to develop a first approach.
O tempo e a vida em Gaston Bachelard
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2017-02-20) Machado, Fernando da Silva; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Ternes, José; Cesar, Constança Marcondes
Cette présente dissertation a pour but de montrer comment Bachelard élabore la notion de vie dans sa philosophie à travers une réflexion sur le probléme philosophique du temps et les notions d'instant et de durée. En pensant l'instant discontinu et en l'associant à d'autres concepts présents dans ses écrits, tant épistémologiques que poétiques, nous montrerons comment est atteint le présupposé théorique de complémentarité entre les deux aspects de la pensée de Bachelard. Nous soulignerons également que, dans sa métaphysique, l'être de l'homme cherche sa référence autosynchronique à travers de l'expérience discontinue de l'instant véritablement dynamique où le temps ne coule pas, mais jaillit. Le livre L'intuition de l'instant (1932), oeuvre consacrée à cette réflexion métaphysique sur le temps aboutir, quatre ans plus tard à La dialectique de la durée (1936), oeuvre qui, quant à elle, en définissant le concept de durée à partir des différentes temporalités superposées qui constituent l'existence, tous le doux présent les bases d'une philosophie du repos et sont les références privilégiées de cette étude. Il est inutile de rappeler l'importance de la philosophie de Bergson dans cette discussion: c'est en contrecarrant ses théses, tant sur la vie que sur la durée, que Bachelard allait forger sa propre compréhension du concept de vie dans ses deux écrits sur le temps par une opposition entre le concept de la vie vécue (limitée au temps commum/temps transitif) et la vie pensée (limitée au temps de l'esprit/temps immanent). Nous partons de l'hypothése selon laquelle c'est parce que l'esprit peut se heurter à la vie vulgaire et homogéne que la vie supérieure, c'est-à-dire du propre esprit, doit être comprise dans cette philosophie comme une construction rationnelle basée sur une dialectique pluraliste des savoirs sur le temps. Pour conclure ce travail, nous essaierons d'indiquer quelques points relatifs à la valorisation de la vie dans la pensée bachelardienne qui la rend rythmiquement variée et harmonique.
A revisão da ontologia como fenomenologia da vida em Merleau-Ponty
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2017-12-14) Mantovani, Harley Juliano; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Ternes, José; Marques, Rodrigo Vieira; Silva, Claudinei Aparecido de Freitas da; Caminha, Iraquitan de Oliveira
The fundamental purpose of our work was to think a phenomenology of life from the revision of the classic ontology that was designed by Merleau-Ponty. The phenomenology of life required a thought free of the weight of the theoretical structure of classical ontology. For this reason, the phenomenology of life is not initially ready and available in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, but rather, it develops and presents itself through the progressive identification of this philosophy with a project of ontology renewal that begins by showing the conditions of the crisis of contemporary philosophy. The emergence of the need to think of life as the supreme and ultimate question of philosophy, besides denouncing a philosophical deviation from a rationalist inversion, reveals that philosophy did not triumph, on the contrary, if life is understood as the existential eternity of a residue, the thought of life demands that philosophy be a perpetual beginning initially dispossessed of all separate and absolute divinity. The return to a humble beginning, which life expects of us, means to get rid of the vanity of an understanding that leads us to the nihilism that characterizes the forgetting of origins, therefore, only a heroic reason achieves the humility of the beginning, and it was this heroism of a responsible reason that Husserl's phenomenology offered to the ontological project of Merleau-Ponty. If the thought of life necessitates the heroic search for the humility of the beginning, then it presents us the nouvelle ontologie as an Ursprungsklärung which, illuminating the birth of the Logos prior to the idealization of science, leads us to a Naturphilosophie which shows us that the phenomenology of life can not suffer the idealistic rupture of nature, man and God that exists only in the knowledge that constructs labyrinths as rational beings. Finally, based on the humility and heroism of thought en naissance, the phenomenology of life represents the victory over the mythological labyrinth of naturalism, humanism and theism.
Heidegger: da analítica existencial à filosofia da interpelação
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2021-03-29) Martins Filho, José Reinaldo Felipe; Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Casanova, Marco Antonio dos Santos; Duarte, Irene Filomena Borges; Korelc, Martina; Christino, Daniel
Since the 1970s, the studies on Martin Heidegger’s thought in Brazil have focused mainly on the insights gathered from Being and Time, and some other contemporary works. Over the past few years, however, there has been an increasing interest in texts related to what is known as the second phase of Heidegger’s Thought, that is, compiled in the midst of the reorientation given by the author to his philosophy from 1930 onwards. This is true not only in the field of interpretative analysis but also in the implementation of works’ translations that until recently were unavailable to Brazilian readers. Nowadays the panorama is quite different, making it possible to approach concepts that cross from one phase to another, and, more than that, guarantee the “internal cohesion” and/or “organicity” inherent in Heidegger’s work seen in a more comprehensive way. Among other possible approaches, this is the case of the Dasein concept, already introduced in the lectures of the early 1920s, although with a notably more evident repercussion from Being and Time. At that point, in order to reintroduce the question of the meaning of Being in general to Philosophy, Heidegger had come up against two problems: on the one hand, the impossibility of a frontal approach to Being; on the other, the insufficiency of the history of metaphysics in the treatment given to the theme. Precisely in the horizon of this methodological impasse is the election of the entity with ontic-ontological precedence, that is, Dasein, the human phenomenon perceived as existence. There is, then, a crucial conflict between the function of Dasein, such as the one that would deny inheritance to traditional metaphysics, and a concept that for Heidegger had represented its maximum unfolding, namely: the subject. Thus, the project to overcome metaphysics is, in a sense, the attempt to move beyond the subject, in the exploration of a completely new conceptual-hermeneutical apparatus. However, there are those who suspect the capacity of Being and Time to achieve this goal – as is the case with Edith Stein and Jean-Luc Marion – questioning the extent to which Dasein can be perceived as a focus for overcoming metaphysics. In this regard, the texts that have been created from the 1930s have important indications about the evolution process, whether from Heidegger’s understanding of Being, or from the reformulation of the place attributed to the Dasein concept: since the change in its spelling, appearing from there onwards as Da-sein (separated by a hyphen), even the adjectives that started to qualify him, no longer the “holder of the being”, but the “seeker”, the “custodian”, the “caregiver of the truth”. Thereupon, the counterpoint with Being and Time can be carried out mainly from Contributions to Philosophy, written between 1936 and 1938, although published only in 1989. In intermediation between Being and Time and Contributions to Philosophy, works that can be considered the main exponents of the trajectory of Martin Heidegger in a spectrum of more than three decades, the present investigation aims to measure the function of the Dasein concept, raising it as an amalgam in the continuation of a thought intended to the original thinking (Das anfängliche Denken).
Subjetividade e finitude em ser e tempo
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2014-05-23) Martins Filho, José Reinaldo Felipe; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Ternes, José; Drucker, Cláudia Pellegrini
A presente pesquisa visa analisar a questão da subjetividade e sua articulação com o tema da finitude no pensamento de Martin Heidegger. Tomaremos para isso, como referência privilegiada, a obra Ser e Tempo, de 1927, na qual buscaremos os elementos que justifiquem a critica heideggeriana ao conceito moderno de subjectum e a via alternativa que se abre com a analítica da existenciaridade da existência. Em primeiro lugar, nos esforçaremos cm resgatar a o de subjetividade fundamentada pela fenomenologia. tal como é exposta por seu fundador, Edmund Husserl, a fim de aferir em que medida sua influencia determina a constituição de uma investigação sobre o sentido do ser. Em seguida, destacaremos a eleição do ente por excelência, dotado do privilégio ôntico-ontológico, e o seu papel na elaboração de uma nova perspectiva para se considerar o modo de ser do homem no mundo, distinto de abordagens como as da psicologia, biologia ou da antropologia. Descartes e Husserl serão constantes interlocutores nesse itinerário. Encerra o presente estudo o exame propriamente dito da relação entre os conceitos subjetividade e finitude, fundamentais, segundo nossa percepção, para a compreensão da importância, do alcance e da posteridade da filosofia heideggeriana.
Consciência e ego no pensamento do jovem Sartre
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2017-08-29) Rêgo, Augusto Seixas Brandão; Korelc, Martina; http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4776715Y9; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4768409A0; Souza, Thana Mara de; Santoro, Thiago Suman; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de
Le présent travail a pour intention d'analyser les concept de conscience et d'ego tels que développés par le philosophe Jean-Paul Sartre dans ses oeuvres de jeunesse, plus spécifiquement dans l'opuscule la transcendance de l'ego. Une brève présentation historique de l'atmosphère intellectuelle de l'époque de Sartre montre l'importance de la réception de l'oeuvre de Husserl en France mais aussi les obstacles que celle-ci implique relativement à la question du contact immédiat avec le concret. Ce contact, rendu possible par l'idée d'intetionalité développée par Husserl, sera graduellement surmonté au nom d'un transcendantalisme auquel il se référe en tant que phénoménologue. Afin de revenir au concret, Sartre abandonnera l'idéalisme transcendantal au profit d'une relation avec le monde non intellectualiste, qui permettra la réflexion à partir d'une conscience pré-réflexive. Ce type de conscience pourra être perçue dans divers concepts de Sartre développés à la même époque, comme, entre autres, la magie, la mauvaise foi, la temporalité. Notre hypothése d'interprétation avance l'idée selon laquelle la dynamique entre la conscience et l'égo oriente l'argumentation de Sartre dans cette période où l'ego, passant du réfléchi à l'irréflechi, perd son "intimité" et où la conscience reprend sa loi absolue selon notre auteur: l'immédiat.
Georges Canguilhem e a crítica à psicologia
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2021-02-26) Silva, Marcos Bruno; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Souto, Caio Augusto Teixeira; Almeida, Tiago Santos
Le but de ce présent travail est d´examiner comment on peut appréhender le statut épistémologique de la psychologie. Notre recherche s´appuie sur l´oeuvre de Georges Canguilhem, plus particulièrement l´essai de 1958 intitulé Qu´est-ce que la Psychologie? Plusieurs auteurs et théories servent de support lors du développement d’analyses et de réflexions sur le processus de recognition de la Psychologie comme science formelle, comme Immanuel Kant, Michel Foucault et François Châtelet. Pour ce faire, nous cherchons à reconstruire les aspects les plus élémentaires de l´épistémologie canguilhemienne afin de mettre en évidence le caractère unique de sa réflexion philosophique ainsi que l´actualité des critiques de la psychologie élaborées par l´auteur du livre Le normal et le pathologique, ce qui nous permettra de mieux saisir les outils qui rendent possible une critique de la psychologie comme savoir et comme pratique. Après tout, il est ratifié que l’identité de la Psychologie repose sur diverses épistemologies non seulement effectivement considérées comme scientifiques, mais aussi sociales et politiques, dans um mouvement constant entre les individus et la société.
Corpo e subjetividade em Merleau-Ponty
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2017-02-22) Xavier, Luana Lopes; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Damião, Carla Milani; Silva, Claudinei Aparecido de Freitas da
L'objectif de cette travail est d'analyser les thèmes du Corps et de la subjectivité dans l'oeuvre de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, considérant leurs critiques tout comme leurs interprétations de la pensée phénoménologique. Nous comprenons, surtout, que la phénoménologie merleaupontienne a élu l'expérience du corps comme source de la perception. Ainsi, la phénoménologie nous mènera à une approche du corps lié à la subjectivité ou à l’entralecement de l'homme et la nature, présentée dans le travail La structure du comportement et Phénoménologie de la perception. L'intention de notre travail est de montrer comment la pensée de Merleau-Ponty s´efforce à rompre avec les dualismes de la relation corps-esprit et à récupérer les données sensibles de la conscience à partir de l'expérience perceptive, plus précisémment. Nous voudrions donc penser la critique faite par l'auteur des études classiques sur le corps et la division moderne entre l'intériorité et l'extériorité, ayant en vue une phénoménologie de l’entrelacement homme-monde. Pour ce, nous prenons en compte les références que Merleau-Ponty fait à Descartes, Husserl et Bergson, tout comme l’oeuvre La structure du comportement, mais nous proposons, surtout, une lecture possible de la Phénoménologie de la perception.

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