Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia

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A ontologia fundamental heideggeriana em Ser e tempo
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2018-04-10) Barbosa, Alexandre Guedes; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Korelc, Martina; http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4776715Y9; Fernandes, Marcos Aurélio; Christino, Daniel; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de
The Fundamental Ontology is the Heidegger’s project that aims, with the reaching of the sense of Being in general, to found all others possible ontologies since they are characterized by investigating of specifics ways of being. The overall goal of Being and Time (1927), Heidegger’s main work (1889-1976), aims to elaborate the authentic question about the sense of Being by reference to time as possible horizon for His understanding. When we reach this goal, we will be capable to identify the problem of the relationship that give meaning between time and Being, so get properly the understanding the Fundamental Ontology’s project. However, Being and Time was not entirely published in the year 1927, remaining in this state of incompleteness until the death of its author. In this way, our aim is understand if with pause established in the treatise, the general scope and consequently the Fundamental Ontology were compromised in your projects. We will see that the Dasein’s preparatory existential analytic can conduct us to the thematization of the temporality’s problem (temporalität) as condition of the possibility of the Being’s comprehension; and so, we can understanding that the Fundamental Ontology qua project began; and finally, that notwithstanding there are incompletion tasks we can understanding that Being and Time reached its general goal.
Heidegger: a linguagem poética como superação da metafísica
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2023-08-01) Barbosa, Alexandre Guedes; Duarte, Irene Borges; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5635634018289208; Korelc, Martina; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1843883998267808; Korelc, Martina; Casanova, Marco Antonio dos Santos; Fernandes, Marcos Aurélio; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Drucker, Claudia Pellegrini
In the spread of his self-titled “path of thought”, Martin Heidegger framed metaphysics from the ontological difference, a theme that deals with the difference between Being and being, which allows him to affirm that metaphysics neither thinks nor represents Being by itself, but as entity (being of beings). Thus, since for Heidegger the History of Western Thought is a reflection of the way in which metaphysics treats ontology, he sees the need to understand Being properly, then, launches the project of overcoming metaphysics. Given the different interpretations on that subject, ranging from the allegation of a failure to a visualization of a possible transformation of the initial project, the guiding objective of this work is to identify the establishment of this overcoming based on what we believe to be two essential goals of the project: 1) the reach of understanding of Being by itself; 2) the establishment of a language appropriate to this understanding. We will see that the poetic language, for being the free manifestation of time as imagetic prefiguration, intuitive element of the inaugural and creator naming of arising presence, gathering the above goals, allows us to identify that, with the effectiveness of metaphysics’ overcoming (Überwindung), there is a transposition to the unthinking and unsaid by it, which is only possible by abandoning it (Überlassen). However, in this abandonment, it will be possible to understand that metaphysics is not rejected, but transformed in its essence by Being’s thought.
A noção fenomenológica do ego transcendente em Jean-Paul Sartre
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2013) Lima, Polyelton de Oliveira; Korelc, Martina; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1843883998267808; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Moutinho, Luiz Damon Santos; Korelc, Martina
The works The transcendence of the ego and A fundamental idea of Husserl's phenomenology: intentionality reveal the yearning initial Sartre to combat the existence of content within consciousness. Accepting the existence of content and, above all, an operator of conscience I represent a danger to the theory of intentionality. Phenomenology must take into consideration that consciousness is intentional and transcends itself in an attempt to flee from their constitutive lack. The objects of the world are beings in itself, transcendent consciousness, they exist only to the extent that consciousness appears to her. Consciousness, in turn, is to be self-seeking yourself in the world and transcendent objects. The ego is a being in the world and arises when the reflective consciousness analyze the unreflective consciousness. If there is no content in consciousness, cannot be an ego that operates this consciousness because it is autonomous and spontaneous. However, when conscience says "I think", she seems to acknowledge a role or at least a condition of spontaneous self. It is in this sense that the ego emerges as a fiction for consciousness. The consciousness deposits in the ego its spontaneity and this serves to unify the actions, states and qualities.
A operacionalização do método de ἐποχή (epoché) e redução na fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl pelas vias cartesiana e psicológica
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2016-06-03) Matos, Ester Sales; Korelc, Martina; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1843883998267808; Korelc, Martina; Tourinho, Carlos Diógenes Côrtes; Santoro, Thiago Suman
Edmund Husserl construit sa méthode phénoménologique avec le but de fournir une accès à la vie de la conscience d’être subjectif. Pour lui, la méthode doit être la structure appropriée au fonctionnement de cette conscience. La méthode phénoménologique est essentiellement composé par deux instruments méthodiques, la ἐποχή (épochè) et la réduction. Par l’épochè dans son sens général, nous avons suspendu le "regarde" de la conscience du soi réflexif de la thèse naturelle qui conçoit le monde comme un moyen effectif, composé de pré-donnés comme des êtres existants et par consequence nous nous avons réduit la pureté de la sphère de l'immanence de la conscience. Cependant, pour opérationnaliser cette méthode, Husserl a aperçu la nécessité de construire des voies (chemin) méthodiques pour nous donner l’accès clair et fondé de la sphère de la conscience pure ou transcendantale. La première voie méthodique est la manière cartésienne, ceci est basé sur la critique de l'expérience du monde et leur croyance en l’évidence de l'efficacité du monde et par leur procédure, en vue de la divulgation apodictique en menant l'exécution des étapes "parentetizações", exclusions de circuit des contenus naturelles. Comme son «déchets», réduit la sphere de la conscience pure. Cependant, cette approche présente plusieurs limites, dont la principale est l'incapacité de comprendre la «équivocité» d'être subjectif. Car au même temps qu'ils éprouvent l'immanence psychologique pur, le soi même a aussi une dimension transcendantale. De cette façon, Husserl élabore le chemin psychologique à la réduction transcendantale, que, à travers des instruments (étapes) progressive conduit le phénoménologue à passer de l'attitude naturelle, aux domaines des vécus pures particulieres et eidétique, tout le deux en dimension psychologique pure de la subjectivité jusqu’à travers une épochè radicale de toute la sphère ontologique du monde, nous donnent accès au champ transcendantal, où tous les sens objectif est constitué. Grâce à cette façon, nous saisissons la genèse des actes de conscience qui révèle les horizons de la vie passive impliqués dans l'expérience. Cependant, l’analyse de l'opérationnalisation de cette voie a aussi ses limites, en particulier le caractère de dépassement constant que l'expérience de la vie du soi transcendantale détient par rapport à toute tentative d'auto objectivation. Dans cette façon, la méthode phénoménologique d’épochè et la réduction ont besoin de trouver des nouveaux moyens d'assurer la description de la structure de la conscience.
O apelo ético do rosto em Emmanuel Levinas
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2022-09-05) Nascimento, Carlos Eduardo Santos; Korelc, Martina; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1843883998267808; Korelc, Martina; Fabri, Marcelo; Reis, Helena Esser dos
This study was done to investigate the question of alterity through the concept of Face into the original Totality and Infinity written by Emmanuel Levinas. The Face is the reading key to understand Levinas' ethical proposal, since in that Face, the Other is presented in its most absolute otherness. Emphasizing the human Face´s ethical appeal, our research explores how, from a scathing critique to the totality which permeates the entire philosophy history and Western culture, Levinas understands alterity in its infinite condition. With approximations and distances from the phenomenological method in his analysis of the Face, especially in sections 1st and 3rd in the work Totality and Infinity, this dissertation tries to understand and describe how subjectivity becomes responsibility to the Other, as a response to the ethical appeal of the Face, this founding principle of sociality, true human sense in Levinas.
Método e metafísica em Edith Stein: via agostiniana e via aristotélica no procedimento investigativo de ascensão ao sentido do ser
(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2016-12-05) Rocha, Rafael Carneiro; Korelc, Martina; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1843883998267808; Santoro , Thiago Suman; Savian Filho , Juvenal
The book Endliches und Ewiges Sein (Finite and Eternal Being), by Edith Stein, has in its own subtitle the exposition of its purpose:“Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins” (which can be translated as “An Attempt at an Ascent to the meaning of being”). Although the author's starting point for her inquiry about the sense of being is phenomenological, from the fact of the being of the ego - after all, as she herself asserts, her mother tongue is philosophically the language of Husserl - the way of the certainty of the ego (which she calls “augustinian”) occurs in the context of her work together with the way that she calls “aristotelian”, which proceeds from what is intrusive to us [Aufdrängenden] by first, namely, the world of the sensibly perceived things. Despite the apparent antagonism, the author argues that the Augustinian and the Aristotelian ways must complement each other. The philosophical project of Edith Stein, as the author herself emphasizes at the beginning of Potenz und Akt (Potency and Act), should be considered an “ontology” or a science of being, because if we do not understand what is being, we do not understand anything. On the other hand, the transcendental perspective recommends itself as an initial approach because it proposes a consideration of the origin of the meaning of all being, describing the structures of consciousness in which an by which the transcendent world is constructed from immanence. This means that without the transcendental perspective, the ontology remains inexplicable and its constitutive problems are all neglected. However, Edith Stein gives a certain preeminence to the augustinian way, which starts from the life of the ego [Ichleben]. Such preeminence s due to the fact that it is in the realm of the life of the ego that reality itself gains meaning as reality. In this way, the essentialites occupy an eminent position, because just them carry with themselves the possibility of being fully intelligible, thus transmiting intelligibility and meaning to the objects of reality. The book Endliches und Ewiges Sein (Finite and Eternal Being), by Edith Stein, has in its own subtitle the exposition of its purpose:“Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins” (which can be translated as “An Attempt at an Ascent to the meaning of being”). Although the author's starting point for her inquiry about the sense of being is phenomenological, from the fact of the being of the ego - after all, as she herself asserts, her mother tongue is philosophically the language of Husserl - the way of the certainty of the ego (which she calls “augustinian”) occurs in the context of her work together with the way that she calls “aristotelian”, which proceeds from what is intrusive to us [Aufdrängenden] by first, namely, the world of the sensibly perceived things. Despite the apparent antagonism, the author argues that the Augustinian and the Aristotelian ways must complement each other. The philosophical project of Edith Stein, as the author herself emphasizes at the beginning of Potenz und Akt (Potency and Act), should be considered an “ontology” or a science of being, because if we do not understand what is being, we do not understand anything. On the other hand, the transcendental perspective recommends itself as an initial approach because it proposes a consideration of the origin of the meaning of all being, describing the structures of consciousness in which an by which the transcendent world is constructed from immanence. This means that without the transcendental perspective, the ontology remains inexplicable and its constitutive problems are all neglected. However, Edith Stein gives a certain preeminence to the augustinian way, which starts from the life of the ego [Ichleben]. Such preeminence s due to the fact that it is in the realm of the life of the ego that reality itself gains meaning as reality. In this way, the essentialites occupy an eminent position, because just them carry with themselves the possibility of being fully intelligible, thus transmiting intelligibility and meaning to the objects of reality.

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