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Item Os caminhos argumentativos para a unidade das virtudes no Protágoras de Platão: uma perspectiva ética(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2018-08-29) Albuquerque, João Victor; Moscateli, Renato; http://lattes.cnpq.br/8852962822237051; Borges, Anderson de Paula; http://lattes.cnpq.br/2037539775539289; Borges, Anderson de Paula; Júnior, Fábio Amorim de Matos; Bragança, Vitor Mauro Ferreira de RomarizThe present text will address the theme about the unity of virtue in Plato's Protagoras dialogue. The question that will be analyzed is limited to understanding the argumentative paths used by Socrates for the refutation of the sophist Protagoras with his perspective of unity of virtue. Another point that will be approached as a reflection of this analysis will be the understanding of the unity thesis between the virtues - justice, piety, courage, wisdom and wisdom - that the philosopher establishes.Item A relação entre a noção de justiça (dikaiosūnē)e a teoria das Formas na República de Platão(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2017-06-01) Carneiro, Gabriela Carvalho; Borges, Anderson de Paula; http://lattes.cnpq.br/2037539775539289; Almeida, Wellington Damasceno de; Moreira, Vivianne de CastilhoThe main objective of this research is to relate the definition of dikaiosūnē in Plato’s Republic to the Theory of Forms. In order to do that, an analysis of the various areas of knowledge in Plato is necessary, since he does not separate the areas of knowledge as the modern scholars usually do. The main theme in the Plato’s Republic is dikaiosūnē (justice). In pursuing a definition of justice that refutes, in a satisfactory way, the definition of Thrasymachus, Plato develops one of his most daring theories. Arguing against Thrasymachus, and answering fundamental questions proposed in the course of this dialogue (what justice is and if justice is more advantageous than injustice), Socrates proposes a new model of polis education. This model of education is based on a theory of psūchē formation, a metaphysics, a morality and an epistemology. In the Republic, one can note that Plato is interested in producing a theory and also a definition of dikaiosūnē that covers different situations. Since the construction of the definition of dikaiosūnē must be present in something that is fair in any situation, it can be said that the only means for this is to suppose a notion of Form of justice that can be applied in different cases, time and objects/individuals. It is important to note that one of the main theses of the Republic is the proposition that ethics and political theory require members of the polis to think and act on the basis of correct ethical judgments. Such judgments should have entities that are sufficiently fixed, stable and determined, which means, for Plato, that it should have Forms as their base. So, we can affirm that even if there is no instance of justice in the world, the Form of justice will be theret. This Justice, however, will be represented and expressed only in the well-ordered polis, the one governed by individuals who have knowledge of the Forms and govern the city in a way they imitate the Forms. This seems to us one a clear sign that there is in the Republic a Form of Justice.Item Sócrates através da Pítia: indicações sobre a ignorância humana(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2022-09-09) Esteves, Bruna Morais; Borges, Anderson de Paula; http://lattes.cnpq.br/2037539775539289; Borges, Anderson de Paula; Holanda, Luisa Severo Buarque de; Cornelli, GabrieleThe questions of this research are derived from the intersection between the notion of Socratic ignorance and a specific declaration by the oracle of Delphi. In his defense speech, Socrates reports to the jury that he received many years before an oracular message. The speech of the Pythia, the priestess at Delphi, attributes to Socrates the position of someone whose wisdom nobody surpasses. In light of this, Socrates undertakes an investigation into the meaning of the message, given the inherent ambiguity present in oracular declarations and his distrust towards corresponding to the sage alias. In the end, Socratic wisdom consolidates itself through narrow contours, bestowing very little and nothing upon the human aspect. And only to the god, in contrast, does the sage adjective apply. In general, it is possible to affirm that the ignorance declarations made by Socrates and his attachment to the existing or non-existing legitimacy of others’ wisdom arise from this. We attempt, then, to observe the process through which Socrates decides to investigate the divine message and the implications of his final interpretation on that which he describes as a compromise with the god Apollo. His service or activity is equated, in the Apology, to philosophical practice itself. Even though Socratic wisdom occupies the center of this question, the details in Plato’s text seem to indicate that human wisdom itself hardly sounds as wisdom, being first and foremost a recognition of an inherently human ignorance. There are, however, moments in which Socratic practice seems to reside on the threshold of these wisdom interests, since it would be extremely valuable to achieve answers to the investigated themes. As the texts point to a notion of permanent human ignorance, Socrates restructures this condition so that reflecting on our lives or on human excellence remain useful. As the most extensive characterization of Socrates’ philosophy, the Apology brings obstacles related to Socrates’ position in face of knowledge and in face of his involvement with Greek religion. This research, therefore, attempts to deal with these themes.