Wittgenstein's unique “great analysis”: a consequence of the construal of propositional sense as truth-conditions

Carregando...
Imagem de Miniatura

Data

2014

Título da Revista

ISSN da Revista

Título de Volume

Editor

Resumo

Our goal in this paper is to propose a new way of understanding just how the famous process of analysis proposed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus could actually proceed. The guiding line of our presentation will be to assume that in this famous work Wittgenstein adopts as a procedure for elucidating the sense of our representationaldevices – the propositions – a search for a complete and exclusive determination of its truth-conditions. We will show that it was due to this motivation that Wittgenstein has proposed de analytical process that we will call here “The Great Analysis”. The process of analysis proposed by him is a pretty radical one though and implies a lot of different challenges which has to be faced. Our strategy will be to offer first an explanation of how this process could be executed and, then, try to extract its various consequences. Our main interest will be to show how this radical criterion for the elucidation of propositional sense produces deadlocks and leads to a series of very important philosophical consequences. The most important ones are included in the following list: a strict frontier between senseful and senseless propositions; a view of analysis as a process of “analyzing away” all hidden generality contained in general terms, as well as in grammatically apparent “singular terms”; an alternative way of understanding genuine names and their ontological correlates, the simple objects, which fits better our approach; and finally, the most important one, the conclusion that we cannot have both: the presence of unsaturated parts in the elementary propositions and the construal of sense as truth-conditions.

Descrição

Palavras-chave

Análise, Tractatus, Condições de verdade, Wittgenstein, Analysis, Truth-conditions

Citação

VELLOSO, Araceli Rosich Soares. Wittgenstein's unique “great analysis”: a consequence of the construal of propositional sense as truth-conditions. Analytica, Rio de Janeiro, v. 18, n. 1, p. 229-269, 2014.