Singularité et perception visuelle
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2012
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Cet article poursuit un double but : d’une part, situer dans le parcours
philosophique de Wittgenstein une partie de l’histoire du « problème du
champ visuel », thème clé de sa période intermédiaire ; d’autre part, mettre en
lumière sa critique de l’idée d’un champ visuel (et celle de l’idée d’un objet
interne). Nous croyons que ses arguments sont nouveaux, pénétrants, et ainsi
leur intérêt dépasse les limites d’un exposé purement exégétique.
We have a double goal for this paper : one is to trace some of the history of the “problem of the visual fi eld” within Wittgenstein intellectual development, a key concern in the philosopher’s intermediary period. The second will be to present Wittgenstein’s fi nal criticism of idea of a visual fi eld (and that of an internal object). We believe his arguments are novel, penetrating, and so their interest transcends the boundaries of a purely exegetical presentation.
We have a double goal for this paper : one is to trace some of the history of the “problem of the visual fi eld” within Wittgenstein intellectual development, a key concern in the philosopher’s intermediary period. The second will be to present Wittgenstein’s fi nal criticism of idea of a visual fi eld (and that of an internal object). We believe his arguments are novel, penetrating, and so their interest transcends the boundaries of a purely exegetical presentation.
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PORTO, André da Silva. Singularité et perception visuelle. Philosophiques, Montréal, v. 39, n. 1, p. 75-100, 2012.