Os problemas do modelo referencialista e as sensações: uma leitura do argumento da linguagem privada a partir dos jogos expressivos e jogos descritivos de linguagem
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Data
2021-11-11
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Universidade Federal de Goiás
Resumo
This work analyzes the conception of private language in Wittgenstein's book - Philosophical
Investigations, where we understand that such conception arises from the generalization of the
referentialist model of language. Our objective in this research is to propose a way that shows
that not all the words in our language correspond to objects. The referentialist conception,
reflected in the conception of language attributed to Agostinho, serves as an example that the
use of this model results in great misunderstandings when taken to the language games of
sensations. As will be presented in our work, the problems that arise from such a model of
language are philosophical absurdities, since the idea of a private and innate language,
defended by Wittgenstein's interlocutor in the context of the Philosophical Investigations, is a
logical impossibility.It so happens that this model of meaning was also accepted throughout
modern philosophy when establishing the idea that language necessarily corresponds to objects
and that such correspondence depends on subjective criteria. Also, Wittgenstein in the Private
Language Argument (§§243-315), shows that this limited conception of language is logically
impossible, because the criteria of a language are not private, but public. In other words, for
him, words have the meaning that, in community, is used for it, that is why language is
intersubjective. However, at the insistence of Wittgenstein's interlocutor (private linguist) with
the referentialist model, it is revealed that others' even greatest problems were created. An
example of this is the skepticism of meaning, skepticism about the existence of other minds
that end up resulting in the absurdity of Solipsism. To this preposterous, Wittgenstein presents
a philosophical proposal for the language game referring to sensations, which, contrary to the
referentialist model, can be possible, logically. Therefore, we will present the distinction
between the games of expressions and the games of descriptions, as a philosophical proposal
for the existing confusions in the statements about the sensations of pain, considering the
asymmetry between “I have pain” and “He has pain”.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Linguagem privada, Jogos de linguagem, Referencialismo, Sensações, Solipsismo, Private language, Language games, Referentialism, Sensations, Solipsism
Citação
LEITE, Wendel de Jesus Ribeiro. Os problemas do modelo referencialista e as sensações: uma leitura do argumento da linguagem privada a partir dos jogos expressivos e jogos descritivos de linguagem. 2021. 54 f. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (Graduação) - Unidade Acadêmica Especial de Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal de Goiás, Cidade de Goiás, 2021.