Fenomenologia e psicanálise existencial: uma possibilidade para além do projeto original

Abstract

Throughout the history of philosophy, thinkers have been very busy thinking and questioning the Truth of things. We analyzing the scenario, where Sartre brings the concept of phenomenon as something that reveals the Being, which occurs with the relationship of the For-itself (Consciousness) with the In-itself (Object), in contrast to Kant's concept of phenomenon, as something that veils the Being. Starting from these assumptions, Sartre will sketch his phenomenological ontology and will think about how his philosophy can encompass the understanding of man in his totality. So, Sartrean Existential Psychoanalysis will reject some principles of Freudian Psychoanalysis and maintain that the adult is not determined by childhood, but can be influenced by it. In this context, the For-itself, which is free and a constant projection, chooses its Original Project, that is, its priorities. Based on these conceptions, we will present and contest Moura's (2017) thesis about the mutability of the Original Project, while we also refute Colantoni's (2019) conception, which, unlike Moura (2017), defends the immutability of such Project. Finally, we defend an intermediate interpretation, that is, that the Original Project cannot be fully modifiable, only its structures can be resignified.