Os problemas do modelo referencialista e as sensações: uma leitura do argumento da linguagem privada a partir dos jogos expressivos e jogos descritivos de linguagem

Abstract

This work analyzes the conception of private language in Wittgenstein's book - Philosophical Investigations, where we understand that such conception arises from the generalization of the referentialist model of language. Our objective in this research is to propose a way that shows that not all the words in our language correspond to objects. The referentialist conception, reflected in the conception of language attributed to Agostinho, serves as an example that the use of this model results in great misunderstandings when taken to the language games of sensations. As will be presented in our work, the problems that arise from such a model of language are philosophical absurdities, since the idea of a private and innate language, defended by Wittgenstein's interlocutor in the context of the Philosophical Investigations, is a logical impossibility.It so happens that this model of meaning was also accepted throughout modern philosophy when establishing the idea that language necessarily corresponds to objects and that such correspondence depends on subjective criteria. Also, Wittgenstein in the Private Language Argument (§§243-315), shows that this limited conception of language is logically impossible, because the criteria of a language are not private, but public. In other words, for him, words have the meaning that, in community, is used for it, that is why language is intersubjective. However, at the insistence of Wittgenstein's interlocutor (private linguist) with the referentialist model, it is revealed that others' even greatest problems were created. An example of this is the skepticism of meaning, skepticism about the existence of other minds that end up resulting in the absurdity of Solipsism. To this preposterous, Wittgenstein presents a philosophical proposal for the language game referring to sensations, which, contrary to the referentialist model, can be possible, logically. Therefore, we will present the distinction between the games of expressions and the games of descriptions, as a philosophical proposal for the existing confusions in the statements about the sensations of pain, considering the asymmetry between “I have pain” and “He has pain”.