Propriedade e mérito na teoria da justiça de J. Rawls

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2011

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This paper presents the arguments of John Rawls against the merit assumed as a valid moral criterion and against property assumed as a pure individual right, in a democratic and egalitarian society. From that depart, consider that institutionalized meritocracy endorses social violence when superimposes the economic to ethic criterion, efficiency to justice, as well submits juridical protections to social organization, in restricting interpretation of individual liberty and private autonomy. In the fate of the reduction of the political to the moral, concludes that to human rights is proper to be a general theory of justice.

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Propriedade, Property, Mérito, John Rawls, Violência social, Direitos humanos, Merit, John Rawls, Social violence, Human rights

Citação

GONÇALVES NETO, João da Cruz. Propriedade e mérito na teoria da justiça de J. Rawls. Lex Humana, Petrópolis, v. 3, n. 1, p. 74-91, 2011.