Doutorado em Filosofia (FAFIL)
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Item A revisão da ontologia como fenomenologia da vida em Merleau-Ponty(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2017-12-14) Mantovani, Harley Juliano; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Ternes, José; Marques, Rodrigo Vieira; Silva, Claudinei Aparecido de Freitas da; Caminha, Iraquitan de OliveiraThe fundamental purpose of our work was to think a phenomenology of life from the revision of the classic ontology that was designed by Merleau-Ponty. The phenomenology of life required a thought free of the weight of the theoretical structure of classical ontology. For this reason, the phenomenology of life is not initially ready and available in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, but rather, it develops and presents itself through the progressive identification of this philosophy with a project of ontology renewal that begins by showing the conditions of the crisis of contemporary philosophy. The emergence of the need to think of life as the supreme and ultimate question of philosophy, besides denouncing a philosophical deviation from a rationalist inversion, reveals that philosophy did not triumph, on the contrary, if life is understood as the existential eternity of a residue, the thought of life demands that philosophy be a perpetual beginning initially dispossessed of all separate and absolute divinity. The return to a humble beginning, which life expects of us, means to get rid of the vanity of an understanding that leads us to the nihilism that characterizes the forgetting of origins, therefore, only a heroic reason achieves the humility of the beginning, and it was this heroism of a responsible reason that Husserl's phenomenology offered to the ontological project of Merleau-Ponty. If the thought of life necessitates the heroic search for the humility of the beginning, then it presents us the nouvelle ontologie as an Ursprungsklärung which, illuminating the birth of the Logos prior to the idealization of science, leads us to a Naturphilosophie which shows us that the phenomenology of life can not suffer the idealistic rupture of nature, man and God that exists only in the knowledge that constructs labyrinths as rational beings. Finally, based on the humility and heroism of thought en naissance, the phenomenology of life represents the victory over the mythological labyrinth of naturalism, humanism and theism.Item Heidegger: da analítica existencial à filosofia da interpelação(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2021-03-29) Martins Filho, José Reinaldo Felipe; Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3543790024810464; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Casanova, Marco Antonio dos Santos; Duarte, Irene Filomena Borges; Korelc, Martina; Christino, DanielSince the 1970s, the studies on Martin Heidegger’s thought in Brazil have focused mainly on the insights gathered from Being and Time, and some other contemporary works. Over the past few years, however, there has been an increasing interest in texts related to what is known as the second phase of Heidegger’s Thought, that is, compiled in the midst of the reorientation given by the author to his philosophy from 1930 onwards. This is true not only in the field of interpretative analysis but also in the implementation of works’ translations that until recently were unavailable to Brazilian readers. Nowadays the panorama is quite different, making it possible to approach concepts that cross from one phase to another, and, more than that, guarantee the “internal cohesion” and/or “organicity” inherent in Heidegger’s work seen in a more comprehensive way. Among other possible approaches, this is the case of the Dasein concept, already introduced in the lectures of the early 1920s, although with a notably more evident repercussion from Being and Time. At that point, in order to reintroduce the question of the meaning of Being in general to Philosophy, Heidegger had come up against two problems: on the one hand, the impossibility of a frontal approach to Being; on the other, the insufficiency of the history of metaphysics in the treatment given to the theme. Precisely in the horizon of this methodological impasse is the election of the entity with ontic-ontological precedence, that is, Dasein, the human phenomenon perceived as existence. There is, then, a crucial conflict between the function of Dasein, such as the one that would deny inheritance to traditional metaphysics, and a concept that for Heidegger had represented its maximum unfolding, namely: the subject. Thus, the project to overcome metaphysics is, in a sense, the attempt to move beyond the subject, in the exploration of a completely new conceptual-hermeneutical apparatus. However, there are those who suspect the capacity of Being and Time to achieve this goal – as is the case with Edith Stein and Jean-Luc Marion – questioning the extent to which Dasein can be perceived as a focus for overcoming metaphysics. In this regard, the texts that have been created from the 1930s have important indications about the evolution process, whether from Heidegger’s understanding of Being, or from the reformulation of the place attributed to the Dasein concept: since the change in its spelling, appearing from there onwards as Da-sein (separated by a hyphen), even the adjectives that started to qualify him, no longer the “holder of the being”, but the “seeker”, the “custodian”, the “caregiver of the truth”. Thereupon, the counterpoint with Being and Time can be carried out mainly from Contributions to Philosophy, written between 1936 and 1938, although published only in 1989. In intermediation between Being and Time and Contributions to Philosophy, works that can be considered the main exponents of the trajectory of Martin Heidegger in a spectrum of more than three decades, the present investigation aims to measure the function of the Dasein concept, raising it as an amalgam in the continuation of a thought intended to the original thinking (Das anfängliche Denken).