Causalidade por liberdade no mundo fenomênico. fundamentação do conceito de liberdade na Crítica da Razão Pura

Abstract

This dissertation aims to examine whether, in the Critique of pure reason, Immanuel Kant provides sufficient grounds for asserting human freedom in conjunction with causal determinism, a condition necessary for the representation of phenomena. The study first analyzes freedom as an idea produced by human reason within the context of the transcendental dialectic and the antinomies, understood as the result of a natural and inevitable illusion. It then investigates transcendental idealism as Kant’s proposed solution to the antinomial conflicts, as well as reason’s commitment to a belief in transcendental realism. By distinguishing phenomena from things in themselves through transcendental idealism, a conceptual space is established for the idea of an intelligible and unconditioned cause within a causal series of events. The study then examines Kant’s solution to the third antinomy, emphasizing the requirement of an intelligible causality as the ground of the freedom of human actions in the face of the determinism of empirical character. Finally, it discusses whether this transcendental grounding is maintained in the Canon of pure reason, where Kant claims that only practical freedom can be proved through experience, thereby motivating an assessment, drawing on the interpretations of Wood and Allison, of the compatibility or incompatibility between freedom and causal determinism in his philosophy. Ultimately, the investigation shows that the problem of free will is part of a broader question concerning how to situate human beings in a world governed by causal laws, revealing Kant’s attempt to reconcile our self-understanding as rational agents with the deterministic structure of nature.