Um estudo sobre os paralogismos acidentais nas refutações sofísticas de Aristóteles

Abstract

Our object of study in this dissertation is the paralogism due to the concomitant (which we’ll call abbreviated “PDC”). This paralogism is analyzed by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations as a false argument. Our study about this paralogism is divided into four chapters. Through the first chapter we pretend to answer an important question about the PDC’s appearance. Although this paralogism is a false argument, it possess certain similarity with arguments recognized as good by the one refuted. This similarity would be the reason why debaters are refuted by the PDC. Identifying the nature of this similarity is relevant to comprehend how this paralogism’s appearance can be deceitful. The content of the second chapter can be better understood as a deepening of our interest for the subjective or psychological dimension present in the studies about the paralogisms in the Sophistical Refutations. This deepening results in the description of a mental phenomenon which we call “parallel computation”. The parallel computation consists in a rational effort (although it is a misguided one) by the one who is refuted when he tries to make sense of the logical and semantical traits of an argument. This interpretation is motivated by a set of false presumptions held by the refuted one. In the third chapter we present a case study, turning our attention to an instance of the PDC, the triangle paralogism. By studying the relevant passages for the interpretation of this paralogism we put forward what we understand to be exegetical constraints. Afterward, making use of these constraints as evaluative parameters, we analyze some reconstitution proposals of the triangle paralogism. In the final part of our dissertation we analyze the content of the chapter 24 of Sophistical Refutations. In this chapter Aristotle presents us with a inferential principle which isn’t satisfied by any of the PDC’s instance. The interpretation of this principle is a cause of huge controversy in the secondary literature. In order to make a contribution to the specialized debate of this point we test two interpretative hypothesis of this principle’s content, the referential and the intensional interpretation.