Um modelo de leilão para estimular a competição por outorgas de autorização de pequenas centrais hidrelétricas

Abstract

When the Federal Constitution established that the hydropower natural potential is a public good, it has enacted a duty for the Federal State: balancing the hydropower deployment aligned with the public interest. In order to have the right to exploit a Small Hydro Powerplants (SHP), a private-owned company shall follow a federal regulation framework, which can be competition for this exploitation. In this case, the Regulator enacts rules which intends to sort the project that better represents a hydropower natural potential. This dissertation proposes an auction model that aims to foster competition among companies. It will be used a sealed-bid first-price auction, where the agent with higher bid will be continued on the process of small hydro powerplant license. Moreover, it will be availed the regulatory result of the current normative will be evaluated and compared with the auction model proposed. As a result, it is possible that auction mechanism reduces the participation of inadequate or adventure companies. This work shows that Regulator type affect the behavior of the companies which will participate in the process. A kind strong of regulator acts proactively, punishing misconduct and delays, also it maybe decreases presence of inadequate or adventure companies.