A crítica de Alexandre de Afrodísias ao compatibilismo estoico no De Fato

Abstract

One of the central philosophical debates on human freedom contrasts three main positions: libertarianism, which defends unrestricted freedom; determinism, which denies the influence of individual will on events; and compatibilism, which seeks to reconcile human freedom with a causally determined universe. Alexander of Aphrodisias, a prominent commentator on Aristotle, criticizes the Stoic version of compatibilism in On Fate. From a libertarian standpoint, he argues that the Stoics distort philosophical concepts such as cause, deliberation, and assent, attributing to them technical meanings at odds with common sense in order to reconcile moral responsibility with strict causal determinism. However, in presenting the opposing view, Alexander often appears to misrepresent Stoic definitions by removing them from their specific contexts. This study investigates whether Alexander's distortions are deliberate, iustified bv the Aristotelian dialectical method-which prioritizes common notions and reputable opinions-or whether they stem from superficial interpretation. The analysis focuses on five categories of arguments ( ontological, linguistic, logical, psychological, and normative) to determine whether Alexander's misrepresentations are strategic tools for exposing weaknesses in Stoic doctrine or unintended oversimplifications.