Linguagem e realidade no crátilo 383A-390E

Abstract

This dissertation examines the relationship between language and reality in Plato’s Cratylus (383a- 390e), investigating how the philosopher conducts the dialectical examination of the theses of linguistic naturalism and conventionalism. The study analyzes the positions defended by Cratylus and Hermogenes, considering their ontological and epistemological commitments, and subsequently reconstructs Socrates' proposal in light of the concepts of φύσις (“nature”), οὐσία (“essence”), and εἶδος (“form”). It is demonstrated that Cratylus seeks to establish the necessary and sufficient criteria for a term N to be considered a “name”, arguing that only the true description of the nominatum via etymology serves as the foundation of naming. Hermogenes, in turn, investigates not only the necessary and sufficient criteria for a term N to be considered a "name" simpliciter but also the guidelines by which a “good name” is defined from a collective perspective. The study shows that Hermogenes’ conventionalist position is grounded in the articulation between the concepts of τιθέναι (“to establish” or “to impose”) and καλεῖν (“to call”), distinguishing two stages of naming: the imposition of names, governed by individual or collective decision, and the use of names, subject to underlying linguistic conventions. This research demonstrates that the Socratic thesis emerges from the dialectic between these two perspectives, proposing an intermediate conception in which naming must respect both the linguistic norms of the context of interlocution and the ontological structures of reality. The methodology combines philological and philosophical analysis, with a detailed examination of the Greek text and specialized bibliography. The results indicate that, in Cratylus 386e-390e, Plato outlines a highly sophisticated ontological theory, according to which objects possess stable properties and language, to be correct, must respect these attributes.