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Navegando FAFIL - Artigos publicados em periódicos por Autor "Klotz, Hans Christian"
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Item Fichte e Jacobi sobre especulação e vida(2015-12) Klotz, Hans ChristianThis paper aims to elucidate the controversy between Fichte and Jacobi at the stage of the Science of Knowledge “nova methodo”. It is contended that, at this stage, the Jacobian op position between “speculation” and “faith” (or “life”) coined the methodology of the Science of Knowledge. As shown by Fichte’s writings related to the controversy on Atheism, Fichte had appropriated Jacobi’s arguments against the knowledge of understanding – which is exclusively oriented by the principles of theoretical-constructive explanation – and adopted the conception of the Science of Knowledge as an elucidation of the “unconditioned” that stems from the evidence of faith, this evidence being understood as essentially practical. In this respect, the methodology of the Science of Knowledge nova methodo corresponds to the conception of the knowledge of “reason” that Jacobi presented in the second edition of his book on Spinoza’s doctrine. However, despite this agreement with Jacobi, a divergence arises between the positions of Fichte and Jacobi, since the Science of Knowledge does not adopt a realist attitude towards the objects of experience, which is indispensable from the point of view of “life”, thereby submitting the latter to a constructive explanation.Item O fundamento lógico da passagem do arbítrio para a liberdade ética em Hegel(2010-12) Klotz, Hans ChristianThe present article aims to elucidate the logical basis of the passage from arbitrary volition to the will which is free “in itself and for itself” in the Introduction of his Philosophy of Right. The following three claims are defended: 1. The idea of such a passage, conceived as reflexivization of the will, is already present in Fichte’s ethics. However, differently from Fichte, Hegel conceives it on a logical-conceptual basis. 2. The logical basis of the passage in Hegel can be identified with the passage from the logic of essence to the logic of the concept. 3. The explication of the will which is free in and for itself through the logic of the concept does not yet yield the ethical and social character of this freedom, which reveals itself only within the Philosophy of Right itself.Item A intencionalidade da percepção e do agir no jovem Hegel(Araceli Velloso, 2009-12) Klotz, Hans ChristianNos primeiros escritos da sua fase ienense, Hegel defende a con-cepção de uma identidade originária na qual a subjetividade seria “suspendi-da”. O presente trabalho visa explicitar essa concepção como uma contribuição para a teoria da intencionalidade que coloca em foco a unidade entre elementos conceituais e sensíveis (ou emocional-motivacionais) como condição da intencionalidade da percepção e do agir. Num primeiro passo, argumenta-se que nos seus escritos críticos Hegel entende por “filosofia da subjetividade” posições que envolvam uma concepção separadora acerca da relação entre pensamento e sensibilidade na percepção e no agir, estando li-gada à noção do sujeito como controlador distanciado da sensibilidade. Por-tanto, a crítica hegeliana à filosofia da subjetividade dirige-se contra tal concepção da intencionalidade e do sujeito desta. Num segundo passo, a-borda-se a alternativa hegeliana a essa imagem - a concepção da unidade in-dissolúvel do pensamento e da sensibilidade como fundamento da percepção e do agir. Por fim, a imagem da autoconsciência adotada na Fenomenologia do Espírito é analisada como implicação dessa concepção da intencionalidade. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ In the first writings of his Jena period, Hegel defends the conception of an original identity through which subjectivity is "suspended". The present article aims to expound this conception as a contribution to the theory of intentionality which focusses on the unity of conceptual and sensuous (or motivational) elements as a condition of the intentionality of perception and action. In a first step, it is argued that in his early writings, by "philosophy of subjectivity" Hegel understands positions which separate the conceptual and the sensuous elements of perception and action, conceiving at the same time the subject as a distanced controller of sensibility. Thus, the hegelian critique of the philosophy of subjectivity is directed against such a conception of intentionality and its subject. In a second step, the hegelian alternative to this picture is exposed - the conception of an indissoluble unity of thinking and sensibility as being fundamental to perception and action. Finally, the picture of self-consciousness which arises in the Phenomenology of Spirit is analyzed as an implication of the conception of intentionality adopted in the earlier writings.Item Liberdade e imagens de mundo em Kant e Fichte(2012-12) Klotz, Hans ChristianThe present article aims to reconstruct the transformation of central elements of Kant’s practical philosophy in Fichte’s philosophy of religion, more precisely: in Fichte’s The Instruction for the blessed Life from 1806. In particular, it will be shown that Fichte adopts the Kantian connection between freedom, image of the world and religion within a monist conceptual framework. It is argued that Fichte deepened the conception of images of the world by conceiving the spontaneous way in which such images are constructed as the fundamental exercise of human freedom. At the same time, it is shown that in his theory of the possible images of the world, Fichte abandons not only Kant’s moral theology, but also the project of a defense of the moral point of view in a kantian sense.Item Teleologia e moralidade em Kant e Fichte(2009) Klotz, Hans ChristianThe present article aims at reconstructing the transformation of Kant’s theory of teleological judgment in Fichte’s Doctrine of ethics. As will be shown, Fichte read the Kantian doctrine about teleological judgment and moral teleology as a contribution to an ethical theory which does not only investigate the principle of pure practical reason and the question of its validity, but also the conditions of the applicability of the principle. Thus, Fichte incorporates the theory of reflective judgment into practical philosophy. In the first part of the article, the principal elements of Kant’s conception of teleological judgment in the third Critique will be remembered. The second part expounds the “deduction of the reality and applicability of the principle of morality” in the second part of Fichte’s Doctrine of ethics, showing that Fichte there adopts central concepts of the Kantian theory of reflective judgment, in order to make explicit necessary presuppositions of moral acting. The final part argues that the Fichtean theory of the conditions of the applicability of the moral law does not only include a new systematic localization of teleology, but also transforms the Kantian conception of nature and of the relation between nature and freedom.