Considerações sobre o conceito de erro em humano, demasiado humano: uma interlocução entre Nietzsche e Spir

Abstract

This article explores the theory of error in Human, all too human, seeking to determine which criterion raised by Nietzsche to affirm that such and such representation of morality, religion or aesthetics is deceptive. The criterion provided by Nietzsche inevitably passes through a true correspondenceist conception. In the case of Human, the error will be lodged in the lack of adequacy between our representations and “nature” or “real world” (MA/HH 11). Nietzsche's fundamental interlocution in the matter is Spir, a philosopher who will be considered here as a source. We will explore interlocution with Spir through the prism of the concept of representation (conditioned), the concept of error and the role of the unconditioned principle of identity as articulated in Pensamento e Realidade (1877). The article identifies Nietzsche's parasitic position in relation to Spir's theses, on the one hand feeding the logical-argumentative power in relation to metaphysical theses, on the other hand, rejeiting the status of the unconditioned concept. From Spir, Nietzsche extracted this incompatibility between the logical-representational structure and nature, understood as Heraclitian truth.