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Item Interlocução e analogias enganadoras no The big typescript e no Livro azul de Wittgenstein(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2020-08-13) Costa , Paulo Henrique Silva; Porto, André da Silva; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3598537464598916; Porto, André da Silva; Engelmann, Mauro Luiz; Carvalho, Marcelo Silva de; Silva, Guilherme Ghisoni da; Velloso, Araceli Rosich SoaresThe present thesis deals with the crucial role that “misleading analogies” play in relation to the formulation and dissolution of philosophical problems in Wittgenstein. For this, we will restrict our discussion to the end of the middle period and the beginning of the final period, respectively, to The Big Typescript (1932-1933) and the Blue Book (1933-1934). The reason why we will restrict the discussion to this period of transition concerns the fact that there is a growing concern of Wittgenstein about the pragmatic character of language there, which we will call in the text “interlocutory conception of language”. Therefore, we will argue that, during the transition period between The Big Typescript and the Blue Book, there is a change in respect to the conception of language in question, supported, firstly, by the idea of “grammar as a system of rules”, which we will refer to as conception of language that “operates in a vacuum” and, secondly, in the pragmatic character of language, which we will refer to as a language that describes “interlocutory situations”. In this way, we will show that the notion of “rule” behind each conception of language is distinct, namely, in The Big Typescript there is, on the one hand, an operational conception of rule, and in the Blue Book, on the other, there is a relational conception. Given that, we will argue that misleading analogies play a crucial role in the formulation and dissolution of philosophical problems due to the improper import of grammars involved. This occurs in The Big Typescript because of improper importation of different grammars and their respective systems of rule, and in the Blue Book because of the use established within an interlocutory situation.Item A noção fenomenológica do ego transcendente em Jean-Paul Sartre(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2013) Lima, Polyelton de Oliveira; Korelc, Martina; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1843883998267808; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Moutinho, Luiz Damon Santos; Korelc, MartinaThe works The transcendence of the ego and A fundamental idea of Husserl's phenomenology: intentionality reveal the yearning initial Sartre to combat the existence of content within consciousness. Accepting the existence of content and, above all, an operator of conscience I represent a danger to the theory of intentionality. Phenomenology must take into consideration that consciousness is intentional and transcends itself in an attempt to flee from their constitutive lack. The objects of the world are beings in itself, transcendent consciousness, they exist only to the extent that consciousness appears to her. Consciousness, in turn, is to be self-seeking yourself in the world and transcendent objects. The ego is a being in the world and arises when the reflective consciousness analyze the unreflective consciousness. If there is no content in consciousness, cannot be an ego that operates this consciousness because it is autonomous and spontaneous. However, when conscience says "I think", she seems to acknowledge a role or at least a condition of spontaneous self. It is in this sense that the ego emerges as a fiction for consciousness. The consciousness deposits in the ego its spontaneity and this serves to unify the actions, states and qualities.Item Senso comum e juízo político em Hannah Arendt(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2020-03-20) Santos Filho, José dos; Silva, Adriano Correia; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7465568204123045; Silva, Adriano Correia; Lopes, Adriana Delbó; Moscateli, Renato; Müller, Maria Cristina; Aguiar, Odílio AlvesThis research aims to reflect on the potentialities inherent in common sense from which Hannah Arendt will think the effectiveness of a political judgment. The first impressions of a systematic reflection of the author on the subject show that the reasoning from human common sense, as opposed to philosophical thinking, is directly related to a mundane reality where everything comes to be in its own “appearance”. At this moment, common sense is responsible for bringing together all the particular impressions of men and conforming them to standards compatible with the human condition of sentient beings. Here, the common sense is literally understood as a sense that guarantees to men the worldly reality of "appearances." From dialogical reading with Kant, Arendt discovers that there is a direct link between common sense and the judgment of taste, or reflexive judgment. In this context the common sense is understood as sensus comunnis, or as a sense that establishes community. The purpose of the sensus comunnis is to ensure that our reflective judgment, or our judgment of taste, reaches a common agreement between the members of the same community. This understanding goes back to the humanist tradition that, since Cicero, already recognized the political potential contained in the cultivation of the sensus commum that guided men to always judge on the basis of the values shared by the community. We emphasize that common sense, in both contexts presented by Hannah Arendt, is invariably oriented toward the judgment of the world. Judgment from common sense, whether by sensible criteria compatible with the condition of sentient beings or by the very reflective nature of the judges of taste, constitutes a political judgment par excellence.Item O conceito de tempo em Bertrand Russell: do platonismo ao construtivismo(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2020-08-03) Souza Junior, Jean Carlos Campos de; Silva, Guilherme Ghisoni da; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3762247800421770; Silva, Guilherme Ghisoni da; Ferraz Neto, Bento Prado de Almeida; Porto, André da SilvaThis dissertation aims to analyze two periods of Bertrand Russell's philosophy (Platonism 1899 - 1912 and Constructivism 1913 - 1918), in which he developed his temporal theories that are studied and have an impact until today. Russell might be considered the main defender and exponent of the static theory of time. Although he revised his conception of time during the years of study, he was always in favour of the static theory. Take into account that Russell and Moore revolted against English idealism in the late 19th century, Russell became a Platonist. At the beginning of the Platonist period, Russell ignores epistemological notions adopting a vast ontology. The first theory of time that we see in the dissertation is the absolute theory of time, defended between 1899 - 1912. The main characteristic of an absolute theory of time is that it infers instants or moments in reality. However, in the article On Denoting (1905), we see an abandonment over the years of entities that were previously part of Russell's Platonic heaven. Regarding his temporal theory, even in 1912, Russell was against the idea of a theory of relational time - as opposed to the theory of absolute time. Because a relational theory without instants as primitive entities does not guarantee the construction of a time series. Only with the development of the method of construction of instants proposed by Whitehead, Russell's workmate in the philosophical project of Principia Mathematica, a relational theory might be developed, without having to postulate moments prior to the events. From constructivism, and with the Occam's Razor principle to deflate his ontology, Russell does not postulate anything beyond what is given to us, i.e., the sense-data. In this way, all entities that might be constructed from something simpler (what we perceive via acquaintance (sense-data)) will not need to be postulated. In this dissertation, we will see the change that occurs in Russellian philosophy taking as its starting point its purely logical arguments in favour of the absolute theory towards a concern with its ontology over the years in order not to postulate anything beyond what is given to us.