O conceito de tempo em Bertrand Russell: do platonismo ao construtivismo

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Universidade Federal de Goiás


This dissertation aims to analyze two periods of Bertrand Russell's philosophy (Platonism 1899 - 1912 and Constructivism 1913 - 1918), in which he developed his temporal theories that are studied and have an impact until today. Russell might be considered the main defender and exponent of the static theory of time. Although he revised his conception of time during the years of study, he was always in favour of the static theory. Take into account that Russell and Moore revolted against English idealism in the late 19th century, Russell became a Platonist. At the beginning of the Platonist period, Russell ignores epistemological notions adopting a vast ontology. The first theory of time that we see in the dissertation is the absolute theory of time, defended between 1899 - 1912. The main characteristic of an absolute theory of time is that it infers instants or moments in reality. However, in the article On Denoting (1905), we see an abandonment over the years of entities that were previously part of Russell's Platonic heaven. Regarding his temporal theory, even in 1912, Russell was against the idea of a theory of relational time - as opposed to the theory of absolute time. Because a relational theory without instants as primitive entities does not guarantee the construction of a time series. Only with the development of the method of construction of instants proposed by Whitehead, Russell's workmate in the philosophical project of Principia Mathematica, a relational theory might be developed, without having to postulate moments prior to the events. From constructivism, and with the Occam's Razor principle to deflate his ontology, Russell does not postulate anything beyond what is given to us, i.e., the sense-data. In this way, all entities that might be constructed from something simpler (what we perceive via acquaintance (sense-data)) will not need to be postulated. In this dissertation, we will see the change that occurs in Russellian philosophy taking as its starting point its purely logical arguments in favour of the absolute theory towards a concern with its ontology over the years in order not to postulate anything beyond what is given to us.



CAMPOS, J. O conceito de tempo em Bertrand Russell: do platonismo ao construtivismo. 2020. 142 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiânia, 2020.