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Item A noção fenomenológica do ego transcendente em Jean-Paul Sartre(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2013) Lima, Polyelton de Oliveira; Korelc, Martina; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1843883998267808; Almeida, Fábio Ferreira de; Moutinho, Luiz Damon Santos; Korelc, MartinaThe works The transcendence of the ego and A fundamental idea of Husserl's phenomenology: intentionality reveal the yearning initial Sartre to combat the existence of content within consciousness. Accepting the existence of content and, above all, an operator of conscience I represent a danger to the theory of intentionality. Phenomenology must take into consideration that consciousness is intentional and transcends itself in an attempt to flee from their constitutive lack. The objects of the world are beings in itself, transcendent consciousness, they exist only to the extent that consciousness appears to her. Consciousness, in turn, is to be self-seeking yourself in the world and transcendent objects. The ego is a being in the world and arises when the reflective consciousness analyze the unreflective consciousness. If there is no content in consciousness, cannot be an ego that operates this consciousness because it is autonomous and spontaneous. However, when conscience says "I think", she seems to acknowledge a role or at least a condition of spontaneous self. It is in this sense that the ego emerges as a fiction for consciousness. The consciousness deposits in the ego its spontaneity and this serves to unify the actions, states and qualities.Item O conceito de tempo em Bertrand Russell: do platonismo ao construtivismo(Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2020-08-03) Souza Junior, Jean Carlos Campos de; Silva, Guilherme Ghisoni da; http://lattes.cnpq.br/3762247800421770; Silva, Guilherme Ghisoni da; Ferraz Neto, Bento Prado de Almeida; Porto, André da SilvaThis dissertation aims to analyze two periods of Bertrand Russell's philosophy (Platonism 1899 - 1912 and Constructivism 1913 - 1918), in which he developed his temporal theories that are studied and have an impact until today. Russell might be considered the main defender and exponent of the static theory of time. Although he revised his conception of time during the years of study, he was always in favour of the static theory. Take into account that Russell and Moore revolted against English idealism in the late 19th century, Russell became a Platonist. At the beginning of the Platonist period, Russell ignores epistemological notions adopting a vast ontology. The first theory of time that we see in the dissertation is the absolute theory of time, defended between 1899 - 1912. The main characteristic of an absolute theory of time is that it infers instants or moments in reality. However, in the article On Denoting (1905), we see an abandonment over the years of entities that were previously part of Russell's Platonic heaven. Regarding his temporal theory, even in 1912, Russell was against the idea of a theory of relational time - as opposed to the theory of absolute time. Because a relational theory without instants as primitive entities does not guarantee the construction of a time series. Only with the development of the method of construction of instants proposed by Whitehead, Russell's workmate in the philosophical project of Principia Mathematica, a relational theory might be developed, without having to postulate moments prior to the events. From constructivism, and with the Occam's Razor principle to deflate his ontology, Russell does not postulate anything beyond what is given to us, i.e., the sense-data. In this way, all entities that might be constructed from something simpler (what we perceive via acquaintance (sense-data)) will not need to be postulated. In this dissertation, we will see the change that occurs in Russellian philosophy taking as its starting point its purely logical arguments in favour of the absolute theory towards a concern with its ontology over the years in order not to postulate anything beyond what is given to us.